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Simon Saunders and David Wallace are attempting to use a modified form of David 
Lewis's analysis of personal fission to support the thought that prior to undergoing 
Everett branching an informed subject can be uncertain about which outcome s/he will 
observe. I argue that the seductive appeal of the idea is an illusion arising out of failure to 
distinguish between the provenance and reference of the relevant observers’ utterances. 
 
Simon Saunders and David Wallace suggest that a subject about to knowingly undergo branching in the Everett 
multiverse can be understood to be uncertain about what s/he will experience if David Lewis's view of  the 
transtemporal identity of persons through fission is modified (Saunders and Wallace 2007, Wallace 2005a: sec. 
3.4, 2005b:14; Lewis 1976). Wallace has what can appear to be an independent argument for pre-measurement 
uncertainty in making intelligible Hugh Everett III's ‘relative state’ interpretation of quantum mechanics ; it is 
an argument from linguistic interpretative charity. I shall not be challenging that argument here but I shall have 
something to say about it in relation to the Lewis-based idea. Wallace’s 2005 papers only make brief mention of 
this idea but it is the focus of attention of Saunders’ and Wallace’s (2007). 
Lewis used the world-tube (or ‘worm’) version of transtemporal identity which takes a persisting object 
to be an aggregate of temporal parts or ‘stages’. For personal identity, the cement which holds the aggregate of 
person-stages together is an ‘R-relation’ between temporally juxtaposed stages. In a case of genuine personal 
fission some temporal stage S at time T has multiple successors at a later time T+ which are all R-related to S. 
Independently of any concern about Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics there has been discussion of 
the possibility of such personal fission in imaginary cases of partial brain transplants and malfunctioning 
teleporters, dealt with at length by Derek Parfit (1984). Lewis argued that each of these multiple successors can 
be understood to be a stage of a distinct persisting person who has their origin prior to T and who persists to at 
least T+. The histories of these distinct persons thus overlap prior to T+. The stage S is a stage of many 
persons, one for every downstream branch of the ‘world-tree’ of which the pre-fission segment is the trunk. 
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Putting this idea into the context of a quantum measurement in Everett's multiverse where a measurement of 
the spin of a particle relative to some arbitrarily given  spatial direction is made, there are as many observers as 
there are downstream branches. In realistic Everettian terms that means that there will be a vast and 
indeterminate number of observers. However, leaving aside very low amplitude branches, the observers will 
partition post-measurement into a set of observers seeing spin-up and and a set of observers seeing spin-down. It 
will do no harm to simplify this setup for the sake of clarity. So imagine the idealised situation where there is a 
single fission into two branches with no subsequent branching. What is important here is tracking identity so 
we can set aside the quantum-mechanical amplitude. 
Our observer, Hydra, is assumed to believe the Everett interpretation and to be fully informed about the 
relevant aspects of her quantum-mechanical predicament. She has prepared her Stern-Gerlach apparatus at time T 
for a measurement of the residual x-spin of a silver atom and the result is going to be, according to the Everett 
interpretation, that at the later time T+ Hydra will have two ‘successors’ one of whom will see the result UP 
and the other the result DOWN. On the Lewisian analysis of fission there are in this scenario two observers who 
we can label HydraUP and HydraDOWN. Following Lewis, these Hydras have distinct stages at T+, where the 
outcomes UP and DOWN are respectively seen, and common stages up to and including T. Saunders’ and 
Wallace’s claim is that at T each of the Hydras can truly say ‘I am either HydraUP or HydraDOWN but I do not 
know which ’. Thus each Hydra at T is subject to ignorance about which person she is and this justifies the 
assertion that each is uncertain about what she is going to see.  
The idea can be seductive but we need to look closely at how people are understood to refer to themselves on 
the world-tube version of transtemporal identity in order to unmask what I shall argue is an illusion ignorance. 
Firstly, let’s look at what Saunders and  Wallace have to say in support of the idea. Here is Wallace : 
 
According to Lewis’s proposal, if at some stage in my future I am to undergo branching into two 
copies, then (timelessly) there are two people, and my current (pre-branching) person stages are 
shared by both of them. 
On the additional assumption that the correct referent of utterances and of mental states is a 
person at a time (rather than a person-stage) it follows that I am genuinely ignorant of my post-
branching future. For when I say ‘who will I become’ that statement should actually be ascribed 
to two versions of me (one of whom will, post splitting, become each version of me). Since (as a 
consequence of any physicalist approach to mind) any thoughts and beliefs I have at a time 
supervene on my person-stage at that time and since the two versions of me share all person-stages 
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prior to branching it follows that it is impossible for the two versions of me to resolve their 
ignorance. 
What are they ignorant about ? Not of course any propositional knowledge, but something 
more indexical (2005a, sec. 3.4) 
 
This is much too quick because we need to know more about how an utterance of ‘I’ refers to the utterer for 
the idea to be coherent, especially as we’re in a novel situation where a single vocal event is to be understood to 
express the utterances of more than one person. It’s not what Wallace dubs the ‘additional assumption’ that it is 
persons who utter rather than person-stages which is the problem. It’s the lack of any hint of a mechanism 
whereby each of Wallace’s dual utterers secures an indexical reference to themself by the use of ‘I’ prior to 
fission. Wallace covers this lacuna by alluding to the ‘ascription’ of each utterance to their respective utterer but, 
as I shall explain, this idea of ascription trades on a mechanism of indexical reference which is unproblematic in 
non-branching contexts but which is inapplicable to branching. Symptomatic of Wallace’s neglect of the 
distinction between the identification of speakers and of the referents of their utterances is his use of the term 
‘referent’ in line 4 of the above quote and the word ‘ascribed’ in line 6. 
Saunders’ and Wallace’s recent paper on the idea reinforces the impression that they are failing to distinguish 
between the attribution of an utterance to an agent and the determination of the reference of the ostensibly self-
referential term ‘I’ within that utterance : 
 
We do better to attribute [pace Lewis] thoughts and utterances at t to continuants C at t. 
That is, thoughts or utterances are attributed to ordered pairs  〈C,t〉 or slices of persons 〈C,S〉, S ∈ 
C , not to temporal parts themselves. This is to apply whether of not there is branching. In the 
absence of branching we obtain the standard worm-theory view ; in the presence of branching, we 
conclude that there are two or more thoughts or utterances expressed at t, one for each of the 
continuants at that time. 
Lewis ruled out this semantics peremptorily. Suppose continuants C1 and C2 share the 
temporal part S at t, and suppose C1 dies shortly after the branching, whilst C2 survives. Then, 
said Lewis, C1 and C2 ‘cannot share the straightforward commonsensical desire that he himself 
survive’, because ……. [there follows a quote from Lewis (1976 :74)] ……. 
True enough if there is only one thought. But why not if there are two, if the referent of ‘I 
myself’, thought or uttered at time t (at temporal part S) is a continuant, as in the non-branching 
case ? (Saunders and Wallace 2007 :2)   
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I shall not detour into exegesis of Lewis here, but the fact is that Saunders’ and Wallace’s proposed 
semantics is incomplete. They provide no explanation whatsoever of how they pass from the idea of attributing 
utterances to continuants to the idea that ‘the referent of « I myself » …. is a continuant’. To be clear about 
what is at issue here, generally in linguistics it is accepted that the attribution of an utterance to an agent, the 
person deemed to make that utterance, is distinct from whatever determines the referents of words and phrases 
uttered by that agent. What Saunders and Wallace are doing is effectively to maintain that this distinction need 
not be made in the case of a phrase like ‘I myself’. They apparently assume that such a phrase self-evidently 
refers to the person to whom it is attributed. That may seem an innocuous assumption but in the context before 
us here it is crucial that it is not allowed to pass without some comment for Saunders’ and Wallace’s idea turns 
on this assumption. I shall explain in a moment that in non-branching situations where a world-tube analysis of 
transtemporal identity is adopted there is an unproblematic account of how the term ‘I’ refers to the person 
making an utterance of it and that that account is not available in branching contexts. What Saunders and 
Wallace need is the idea that utterances of ‘I myself’ made severally by overlapping continuant persons (and thus 
instantiated by single utterance tokens) severally refer to the persons uttering them. Saunders’ and Wallace’s 
proposed semantics needs to be supplemented by an account of how the reference of ‘I myself’ is determined for 
overlapping persons. 
Providing such an account of continuant persons’ self-reference in non-branching circumstances is 
straightforward. What is involved may be clearer if we look first of all at how ordinary indexical reference by a 
person to some object in their environment is understood to operate according to the world-tube view of 
transtemporal identity when fission is not involved. On the ‘endurance’ view of transtemporal identity a 
persisting object is ‘wholly present’ at all times in its history. The world-tube view denies this, taking a 
persisting object to be its history, an aggregate of temporal parts. On the endurance view a subject is wholly 
present at any time at which s/he makes an indexical reference, as is the environmental object to which s/he 
refers. As both referer and referent are wholly present at the time the reference is made there seems to be no 
problem in principle about there being an indexical relation between them at that time. In contrast, on the world-
tube view it is only temporal parts of the referer and the referent which are present at the time the reference is 
made. 
But there is no real difficulty for the world-tube theorist here. An utterance is made at a time by a person and 
the utterance is tokened by an event, usually vocal, which is associated with a stage which is a temporal part of 
that person's body according to world-tube theory. Suppose that in a non-branching context René, faced with an 
apple, says ‘That apple is green’ at time T. At time T a stage of René's body is associated with a vocal event 
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which is understood to be a token of ‘That apple is green’. At time T there is an apple-stage which is 
appropriately related to the body-stage associated with the vocal event and that apple-stage is a temporal part of a 
single apple. That's how René succeeds in indexically referring to an apple: there is an appropriate juxtaposition 
of the utterance token associated with a stage of René's body and a stage of the indicated apple. The idea brings 
to mind the image of a chromosome pair, touching in the middle: the world-tube subject successfully refers to a 
world-tube object at a time because stages of each world-tube are in an appropriate relation to each other at that 
time. 
Now go on to the non-branching case where René says ‘This is my body’, an unusual statement, but we 
would generally take it to be perfectly intelligible. He might stub a finger at his chest for gestural emphasis but 
that would be strictly unnecessary, René’s use of ‘this’ would be enough to indicate the body in question. That 
is because the site of the token of ‘this’ is a body-stage which is a stage of a unique world-tube body. Like 
René’s reference to the apple, his reference to his body picks out a unique world-tube referent. But what of 
René’s reference to himself ? Here again the reference has to go via his body, there is nothing else which can 
provide evidence of  which person René is, as is illustrated by everyday expressions such as ‘I’m over here !’. 
For René’s utterance of  ‘This is my body’ to be true the body picked out by the his use of ‘this’ has to be 
the body belonging to the person who is making the whole utterance. Clearly, the body-stage which is the site 
of the whole utterance is the very same as the body-stage which is the site of the utterance of ‘this’ and, thanks 
to the non-branching context, the body-stage in its role as determining a referent of the use of ‘this’ determines 
the same world-tube object as the body-stage in its role as determining the person who is the source of the 
utterance. 
However, things do not go so smoothly for Lewis’s world-tube view of personal identity in branching 
contexts. To spell out why, let us return to the case of the Hydras. According to the Saunders/Wallace proposal 
both HydraUP and HydraDOWN at time T, prior to fission, can truly say ‘I am either HydraUP or 
HydraDOWN but I don't know which’. Both the Hydras say this severally at the same time since a single 
utterance token tokens two utterances, one made by HydraUP and the other made by HydraDOWN. Saunders 
and Wallace require that the Hydras are able to use ‘I’ in the everyday way in which we understand it, so that 
HydraUP refers to HydraUP when she uses ‘I’ and HydraDOWN’s ‘I’ refers to HydraDOWN. That must imply 
that both the Hydras can successfully indexically refer to their own bodies, since, as we saw with René, bodies 
are all we have to go on in determining which utterance of ‘I’ refers to which person. 
But HydraUP and HydraDOWN cannot each indexically refer to her own body via an utterance of ‘This is 
my body’ which has a single token sited in a single body-stage at time T, prior to branching. For that single 
body-stage is common to the world-tube bodies of both HydraUP and HydraDOWN. Why should the ‘this’ in 
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HydraUP’s utterance of ‘This is my body’ be understood to refer to HydraUP’s body rather than to 
HydraDOWN’s ? There is no reason. And if neither of the Hydras can secure reference to their own bodies then 
neither can secure reference to herself via an utterance of ‘I’. 
What is emerging here is that an utterance of ‘I’ in Lewisian contexts of multiple utterance cannot  
straightforwardly be assumed to refer to the utterer. It would not be good enough to say that this points to 
exactly the ignorance for which Saunders and Wallace want to argue because the breakdown of indexical reference 
which I have described simply makes the Hydras’ statements of ‘I am either HydraUP or HydraDOWN but I 
don’t know which’ unintelligible. Such an utterance would be as unintelligible as an utterance of ‘That is 
green’ in a context lacking any basis for a mechanism whereby the use of ‘that’ involved an indexical reference 
to a specific object.   
This shows up the problem with Saunders’ and Wallace’s talk of  ‘attribution’. To attribute utterances of ‘I’ 
which share a unique token each to their respective utterer is simply to attribute agents to those utterances. That 
provides no warrant at all for supposing that the referents of those utterances of ‘I’ are the agents who do the 
uttering. To go on to assign the agent as referent is simply to assert that utterances of ‘I’ self-refer even in 
contexts of Lewisian multiple utterance without further ado. But that would be a substantive assumption on 
Saunders’ and Wallace’s part for which they give no justification and which leaves out of account altogether any 
mechanism by which the required indexical reference is secured even though such a mechanism is 
straightforwardly available for the world-tube view of transtemporal identity in non-branching contexts. 
Might Wallace wish to appeal to his linguistic argument for charitable interpretation here in order to justify 
the further assumption which I have revealed? The argument could be that if we in fact inhabit an Everettian 
multiverse then all utterances of ‘I’ would fail to refer to the utterer on a world-tube view of personal identity and 
so we had better, out of linguistic charity, allow that they do so refer. But this would be to neglect that the 
world-tube view is not the only interpretation of transtemporal identity which can cope with branching. Since 
1996 there has become available Ted Sider’s ‘stage theory’ which can embrace the idea of continuant identity 
through branching without involving the concept of multiple utterance (Sider, 1996, 2001). According to stage 
theory persons are stages, not aggregates of stages, and so any utterance at a time has a token which is associated 
with the unique body, itself a stage, which is the body of that person at that time. Thus even if we do inhabit an 
Everettian multiverse utterances of ‘I’ can be understood to indexically refer to the utterer by the straightforward 
indexical mechanism of a token of a single utterance being appropriately associated with the body of a single 
person. 
For readers not familiar with it, here is Sider’s idea, which was not itself motivated by concerns about 
branching. Sider adapted Lewis’s concept of modal counterparts to introduce the idea of temporal counterparts. 
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According to Lewis I have modal counterparts who are persons with blond hair in various ‘possible worlds’. 
For any one of those modal counterparts I am not that person but I bear the relation MIGHT HAVE BEEN to 
that person. According to Sider I have past temporal counterparts who scrumped apples. For any one of those 
past temporal counterparts I am not that person but I bear the relation WAS to that person. If I am about to 
make a spin measurement in the Everett multiverse in the manner of Hydra then, according to Sider, I have  
future counterparts who see UP and future counterparts who see DOWN. For any one of those future counterparts 
I am not that person but I bear the relation WILL BE to that person, so I will be a person seeing UP at time T+ 
and I will be a person seeing DOWN at time T+. Those distinct future counterparts of mine are distinct persons 
(Sider, 2001 : 201). 
Saunders and Wallace might wish to argue that Siderian transtemporal identity is not suitable if we inhabit 
an Everettian multiverse, that we are forced to accept Lewisian identity and that therefore, out of linguistic 
charity, we should generally interpret utterances of ‘I’ to refer to the utterer even though those utterances would 
be multiple in Lewis’s sense. That would be a substantive argument which would need to be brought into play 
to support Saunders’ and Wallace’s proposal that a modified Lewisian semantics can motivate the idea of 
uncertainty of outcome prior to branching. Furthermore, it would imply that there is a more intimate connection 
between the metaphysics of identity and the argument from linguistic charity than Wallace appears to recognise 
in his writings to date. 
In sum, the idea that Lewis’s analysis of personal fission can be used to ground a notion of ignorance-based 
uncertainty prior to Everett branching appears to be inadequate unless it can be backed up by more extensive 
arguments than have been given so far. So Saunders’ and Wallace’s claim to have solved the ‘incoherence 
problem’ of the Everett interpretation is premature. They state the incoherence problem as being the idea that the 
Everett interpretation ‘can give no meaning to the notion of uncertainty’ (2007 :1). Bear in mind that Saunders’ 
and Wallace’s (2007) is concerned with establishing pre-measurement uncertainty and that it may be that the 
Everett interpretation can be rendered intelligible by appeal to a concept of post-measurement uncertainty such as 
Lev Vaidman’s (1998). Wallace himself acknowledges such a possibility (2005a, sec. 4.2 ). 2 
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